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Category Archives: Security

Security Choice

Bruce Schneier wrote recently about airport security after a screener seized a 6-oz jar of past sauce from his luggage:  “the official confiscated it, because allowing it on the airplane with me would have been too dangerous. And to demonstrate how dangerous he really thought that jar was, he blithely tossed it in a nearby bin of similar liquid bottles and sent me on my way.”  He goes on to discuss “the two classes of contraband at airport security checkpoints: the class that will get you in trouble if you try to bring it on an airplane, and the class that will cheerily be taken away from you if you try to bring it on an airplane.”  Airport security need not catch all of the former as long as the risk and consequences of detection are enough to deter one from attempting to bring them aboard.  That’s not true of the latter type of contraband:  “[b]ecause there are no consequences to trying and failing, the screeners have to be 100 percent effective. Even if they slip up one in a hundred times, the plot can succeed.”  He concludes that airport security should choose:  “[i]f something is dangerous, treat it as dangerous and treat anyone who tries to bring it on as potentially dangerous. If it’s not dangerous, then stop trying to keep it off airplanes.”

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Here’s a companion piece to the Schneier article from The Atlantic:  The Things He Carried

Spam Reduction

I received this news alert today from GigaLaw:

“The volume of junk e-mail sent worldwide plummeted after a Web hosting firm identified by the computer security community as a major host of organizations engaged in spam activity was taken offline.  Experts say the precipitous drop-off in spam comes from Internet providers unplugging McColo Corp., a hosting provider in Northern California that was the home base for machines responsible for coordinating the sending of roughly 75 percent of all spam each day.”

75% of spam!?  Here’s the link to The Washington Post story that prompted the GigaLaw alert.  It doesn’t answer the questions hiding in GigaLaw’s use of the passive voice, such as who took McColo Corp. offline?  On what authority?

Another Post story answers some of those questions:  two “Internet Providers”–Global Crossing and Hurricane Electric–pulled McColo’s plug on Tuesday.  Why Tuesday?  A spokesman for Hurricane Electric said “We looked into it a bit, saw the size and scope of the problem [washingtonpost.com was] reporting and said ‘Holy cow!’ Within the hour we had terminated all of our connections to them.  It appears Hurricane Electric acted unilaterally, although McColo has been on Internet security companies’ watch lists for some time. Why Tuesday and not, say, last month or last year?  The timing is unclear.  McColo reportedly was “hosting at least 40 different child pornography Web sites or sites that collect payment for the illicit content.”

Ironically, shutting down McColo may make it harder to track the illegal activity it hosts.  The Post quotes a security consultant:  “”Everything will just be more spread out and harder to mitigate . . . We rather like knowing where the bad activity is coming from, so protecting our networks is easier.”

More on the T Hack

Those interested in the MIT students’ hack of the MBTA’s Charlie Card (”Don’t Enjoin the Messenger“) should read Bruce Schneier’s Wired article, “Boston Cout’s Meddling With ‘Full Disclosure’ Is Unwelcome” and follow the article’s links.  Schneier’s insights into security issues are always worthwhile.

Don’t Enjoin the Messenger

Two weeks ago three students from MIT appeared at DEFCON in Las Vegas to present their successful hack of the Massachusetts Transit Authority’s electronic fare system–the “Charlie Card.” The MBTA went to federal court to enjoin publication of students’ presentation, claiming it would violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. The court granted the injunction on August 9, only to lift it yesterday, ruling that the MBTA was not likely to succeed on its CFAA claim. Follow the story’s arc here, here, here, and here–and then read Bruce Schneier’s timely (8/7) essay from The Guardian. Schneier’s piece discusses the successful hack of the London subway’s Oyster smartcard by students from the Netherlands. The Oyster card’s maker, NXP Semiconductors, sued to prevent publication of the hack; it lost. The Oyster card uses the same chip–the “Mifare Classic”–used by Boston and other transit systems. Schneier writes “[t]he security of Mifare Classic is terrible . . . it’s kindergarten cryptography. Anyone with any security experience would be embarrassed to put his name to the design. NXP attempted to deal with this embarrassment by keeping the design secret.” In ruling against NXP the Dutch court said “[d]amage to NXP is not the result of the publication of the article but of the production and sale of a chip that appears to have shortcomings.” (Emphasis supplied)

These two cases follow a familiar pattern: Company A does a crap job designing or delivering a good or service to Company B; someone blows the the whistle on Company A’s mis- or malfeasance; Company B blames the whistleblower for leaking news of flaw instead of blaming Company A for its lousy performance. Here the Dutch court got it right, and the U.S. court is heading in the right direction.

OpenDNS

With Security at Risk, A Push to Patch the Web in today’s NY Times reminded me about OpenDNS, a free domain name system service.  The article, which deals with a serious security flaw discovered in the operation of the domain name system earlier this year by Dan Kaminsky, an Internet security expert, notes that individuals and small businesses can protect themselves from the flaw by using OpenDNS.   I configured my home network router for OpenDNS a few years ago and never thought about it again.  The router failed six months ago and, reading this article this morning, I realized I never changed the default server settings on the new router to use OpenDNS.  Making and implementing the changes took just a few minutes.  The OpenDNS site provides simple instructions for configuring popular routers and changing DNS settings in Macs, PCs, and other devices.  Take five minutes and do it.

Being secure versus feeling secure

Here’s a good article by Bruce Schneier exploring how “you can feel secure even you’re not, and you can be secure even though you don’t feel it.” Schneier is always worth reading.

Privacy and Security

A story in yesterday’s Wall Street Journal titled NSA’s Domestic Spying Grows as Agency Sweeps Up Data (subscription required) reports that–

According to current and former intelligence officials, the spy agency now monitors huge volumes of records of domestic emails and Internet searches as well as bank transfers, credit-card transactions, travel and telephone records. The NSA receives this so-called “transactional” data from other agencies or private companies, and its sophisticated software programs analyze the various transactions for suspicious patterns. Then they spit out leads to be explored by counterterrorism programs across the U.S. government, such as the NSA’s own Terrorist Surveillance Program, formed to intercept phone calls and emails between the U.S. and overseas without a judge’s approval when a link to al Qaeda is suspected.

The NSA’s enterprise involves a cluster of powerful intelligence-gathering programs, all of which sparked civil-liberties complaints when they came to light. They include a Federal Bureau of Investigation program to track telecommunications data once known as Carnivore, now called the Digital Collection System, and a U.S. arrangement with the world’s main international banking clearinghouse to track money movements.

The effort also ties into data from an ad-hoc collection of so-called “black programs” whose existence is undisclosed, the current and former officials say. Many of the programs in various agencies began years before the 9/11 attacks but have since been given greater reach. Among them, current and former intelligence officials say, is a longstanding Treasury Department program to collect individual financial data including wire transfers and credit-card transactions.

An NSA spokeswoman stated that the Agency “strictly follows laws and regulations designed to preserve every American’s privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.” If you find comfort in that statement, consider this description of how the Agency uses its expanded domestic surveillance authority to pursue leads:

If a person suspected of terrorist connections is believed to be in a U.S. city — for instance, Detroit, a community with a high concentration of Muslim Americans –the government’s spy systems may be directed to collect and analyze all electronic communications into and out of the city. The haul can include records of phone calls, email headers and destinations, data on financial transactions and records of Internet browsing. The system also would collect information about other people, including those in the U.S., who communicated with people in Detroit.

The information collected “doesn’t generally include the contents of conversations or emails.” Generally. That’s a word we lawyers use to say “most of the time we don’t, unless we do.” Even without such content the NSA can identify the parties to phone calls and emails, their locations, and their cell phone numbers. The telecoms enable the NSA’s efforts either by copying all data through their switches to share with the NSA, or by ceding control to the NSA over the switches. The White House is pushing a bill that would immunize the telecoms from liability for privacy claims arising from this data collection. The NSA domestic surveillance program includes elements of and technology from the Pentagon’s Total Information Awareness initiative that Congress defunded in 2003 following criticism of TIA’s potential for civil rights abuses. Before it was killed the Pentagon renamed TIA to Terrorist Information Awareness to make it seem less creepy. Now the NSA is implementing TIA through its “black budget,” beyond effective non-NSA scrutiny.

The Journal story reminded me of a recent Wired column by the always-prescient Bruce Schneier: What Our Top Spy Doesn’t Get: Security and Privacy Aren’t Opposites. Schneir’s column focuses on a proposal from National Intelligence Director Michael McConnell to monitor all–”that’s right, all–” Internet communications:

In order for cyberspace to be policed, internet activity will have to be closely monitored. Ed Giorgio, who is working with McConnell on the plan, said that would mean giving the government the authority to examine the content of any e-mail, file transfer or Web search. “Google has records that could help in a cyber-investigation,” he said. Giorgio warned me, “We have a saying in this business: ‘Privacy and security are a zero-sum game.’”

This states it as baldly as one can. This administration’s top intelligence personnel consider every increase in security to require a corresponding decrease in privacy. As Scheier states “I’m sure they have that saying in their business. And it’s precisely why, when people in their business are in charge of government, it becomes a police state.” Scheier says privacy versus security is a false dichotomy, that the true dichotomy is between liberty and control–and that “liberty requires both security and privacy.”

Schneier on Irrational Responses

Bruce Schneier’s sensible observations on security are always worth reading. Sometimes his observations resonate more deeply, such as this commentary in Wired: Virginia Tech Lesson: Rare Risks Breed Irrational Responses. After the Virginia Tech shootings I wrote in Sense and Senselessness about the urge to “do something” after horrific events and how both pro- and anti-gun control advocates both seized these shootings to promote their respective agendas. Schneier makes the same points in a pithy and clear-eyed overview of this phenomenon, coining this formula: “Novelty plus dread equals overreaction.”

Amateurism vs. Expertise

Two items from Bruce Schneier’s 5/15 Crypto-Gram merit side-by-side attention. First Schneier links to 7 Signs of Terrorism, a video prepared by the Michigan State Police intended to “train” citizens to recognize terrorist activity in the planning stages and report it to the police. A person using binoculars or writing notes on a map could be involved in surveillance, so report him to the police. A person asking questions about bridge, school, power plant–or anything–could be involved in elicitation, so report him to the police. A suspicious person who “doesn’t belong” could be a terrorist, so report him to the police. Finishing the video one asks why the Michigan State Police are encouraging tips based on uninformed hunches from amateurs. Then, in a post titled Recognizing “Hinky” vs. Citizen Informants, Schneier explains why encouraging “people to contact the authorities every time they see something suspicious [will] waste our time chasing false alarms: foreigners whose customs are different, people who are disliked by someone, and so on . . . The key difference is expertise. People trained to be alert for something hinky will do much better than any profiler, but people who have no idea what to look for will do no better than random.” Schneier’s examples and responses to comments flesh out his argument well.